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Numerous experts reason that Russia is a normal country with a mid-range level of 
socioeconomic development. In other words, if one likens countries to students, Russia 
is a C-grade student: neither among the best in class like Finland or Singapore, nor 
among the worst like Zimbabwe. It is of an average mediocrity akin to Argentina.  
Even though such evaluations of Russia over the last decade are hardly unique, 
they have been met by a quite shocking reception among educated Russians. Across 
many generations, the government’s propaganda—correctly or not—claimed the global 
superiority of the Soviet Union in numerous categories. Later on, during Soviet collapse, 
the country was placed in a dramatically lower “school” class and the assessment of 
Russia’s global role reverted to the opposite pole, leading some intellectuals in the early 
1990s to deny any achievements of Russia throughout its entire history.  
Today, the recognition of Russia’s rank-and-file international position has 
become a painful burden for some of its citizens—especially for those who have aspired 
to be among the best and brightest domestically. For instance, Boris Akunin, the eminent 
liberal-minded Russian novelist and vocal spokesman for the opposition during the 
2011-2012 wave of political protests, vividly complained in his popular blog that Russia 
has “turned into a global periphery.”  
For many of the country’s elite and ordinary citizens, such a realization has led to 
frustration and a conspicuous assertiveness. They have become hostage to a kind of 
“mediocrity syndrome,” which has contributed to escapism and the open rejection of the 
ideas and values of A students. They search for a miraculous upswing, to turn Russia 
into a class leader without major effort. The consequences of this mediocrity syndrome 
are not helpful for solving Russia’s real problems. 
 
In Search of an Exit Choice 
Similar to descendants of noble families, Russia has always cared about maintaining its 
prestige and status. This is why many Russians (and not only the elite) have reacted to 
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the multiple changes in today’s world and Russia’s shifting global role with rising 
feelings of disillusionment and alienation, taking the form of nasty words rather than 
active deeds. In the early 1990s, Michael Burawoy labeled this type of reaction to 
Russia’s post-Communist transformation as “involution.” Albert O. Hirschman, back in 
1970, used the term “exit” and juxtaposed this form with active protest, or “voice.” 
While Russia occupies a midrange (or sometimes much lower) position in international 
rankings of socioeconomic development, rule of law, science, and education, one can 
observe a variety of “exit” strategies among Russian citizens, especially among those 
who should not be regarded as C students on the domestic landscape. Many elderly, 
poorly educated, and impoverished inhabitants of Russia’s small towns and rural areas 
rarely bother themselves with existential issues, let alone the global positioning of their 
country. However, the great expectations of the educated and relatively well-to-do 
residents of large cities meet the tough global reality in different ways. No wonder that 
Russia’s elites and also a visible share of its educated class have become victims of the 
mediocrity syndrome in one way or another, often with the following manifestations:  
 
1) escapism, oriented toward the search of false (and/or imagined) alternatives to 
the status quo;  
2) open and conspicuous denial of ideas and values brought to Russian soil by  
A students from the West (as well as from the East); and  
3) attempts to find or invent a miraculous panacea, which will allow Russia to 
surpass international competitors and proudly promote the national “here and 
now” (if not once and forever) without major effort.  
 
In a sense, increasing signs of would-be emigration among Russia’s middle class, 
such as active investment into the language capacities of their children, can also be 
perceived of as a kind of exit, like C students looking to switch schools in the hopes of 
becoming A-level overachievers elsewhere. 
Let us elaborate on the above typology. First are those who do not create trouble 
but waste their own potential. A significant number of Russian scholars, pundits, and 
media personalities are highly aware of their country’s low degree of competitiveness in 
the changing global intellectual market. Their strategic occupation of sometimes exotic 
ideational niches allows them to preserve a certain influence, status, and funding. They 
are akin to those quiet and lonely C students who devote their time to useless and 
riskless ventures like computer gaming instead of homework. These ideational niches in 
present-day Russia are mostly oriented toward reinventing the greatness of the Russian 
past, with means ranging from reestablishing outdated Orthodox doctrines to 
reinventing decrepit brands such as “Moscow as the Third Rome.” These ideational 
trends are typical not only for longstanding reactionaries but also for some intellectuals 
who initially produced some interesting insights but are now contaminating the 
atmosphere with their marginal and peripheral visions. Escapists often justify their 
ideational position by referring to Russia’s glorious past, but in truth their arguments 
are often similar to historical reenactments by amateur actors who don the armor of 
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medieval knights (some of these people even get stuck in character and wear their garb 
every day). Even the most stubborn Russian niche thinkers, however, understand that 
their ideas are doomed to remain within a narrow and nearly forgotten intellectual 
ghetto.  
A second more active and aggressive manifestation of the mediocrity syndrome 
is based upon an explicit and demonstrative rejection of what was called in the 
Gorbachev era “new political thinking.” While the values and institutions of the West 
over the last quarter century have been recognized in Russia as normative guidelines for 
the country’s future, some thinkers disregard these views, similar to C students who 
prefer to juxtapose their jolly ignorance onto some A students. Blaming the West for  
real or imagined sins has become a mainstream pastime not only within the discourse of 
state-sponsored Russian media, but also among some independent-minded intellectuals. 
They often compete with each other to loudly express their disdain for political 
correctness, minority rights, and, most of all, the monstrous public enemy called 
“liberalism.” The problem of this alternative, however, is twofold. Not only does the 
“disgraced” West pay no attention to this gloomy rant, the public, to whom these 
comments are largely addressed, is also sick and tired of listening to conspiracy theories 
and unsubstantiated claims that such views represent the mainstream of Russian public 
discourse.  
Moreover, these anti-Western crusaders have not been able to propose any viable 
alternatives to the “despised” Western values and institutions. Despite the ubiquity of 
arguments about the uniqueness of Russia that serves to justify talk about the need to 
protect it from Western influence in politics, culture, or education, they cannot produce 
positive ideals different from those of the “hated” West. In reality, vicious attackers of 
Western ideas and institutions look like mutineers on their knees: even the harshest anti-
Westernists prefer to drive a Mercedes (or at least a Toyota), use an iPhone (or at least a 
Samsung), and want their children and grandchildren to graduate from Oxford (or at 
least Harvard). This is why the extensive anti-Western rhetoric in Russia has limited 
substantive relevance, to some degree resembling a similar (and similarly useless) late 
Soviet practice. Finally, we note that even though C students in class somehow resemble 
their failing counterparts, one should not put them in the same category: the latter often 
reject learning entirely, while the former are rather mimetic and their explicit envy of A 
students does not preclude them from implicitly following the leaders. 
Third, the compensatory reaction of adolescent C students often manifests itself 
in the form of a highly visible performance: they attempt to launch some ill-considered 
move in order to demonstrate their toughness (or coolness) to other students, 
irrespective of appearance and consequences. The strong Russian tradition of building 
Potemkin villages is widely recognized (it has been a ruse since the eighteenth century). 
We see it these days in the hosting of major global events such as the 2014 Winter 
Olympics or the 2018 FIFA World Cup. More broadly speaking, while some business 
people in Russia are known for their conspicuous consumption of luxury goods, 
Russia’s educated class is more deeply engaged with the conspicuous consumption of 
status-oriented intellectual goods, a movement implicitly aimed at turning themselves 
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from C students to A students through the pursuit of high-class attributes and 
accessories. For example, government-sponsored “nongovernmental” organizations 
held a series of high-level Yaroslavl Global Policy Forums that not only included then-
president Dmitry Medvedev and powerful politicians like Italy’s then-Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi, but also some global intellectual stars such as Nobel winner (and critic 
of American capitalism) Paul Krugman. This event was basically presented as the 
Russian equivalent of the Davos World Economic Forum. In a similar vein, the Kremlin 
sponsors the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, a Russian asymmetric response 
to Freedom House and other international organizations with democracy promotion 
agendas. The Russian institute has two branches, in Paris and New York, and it serves to 
monitor violations of human rights in Europe and the United States. Such tremendous 
efforts have brought rather modest results, however. Attempts to highlight and oppose 
human rights violations in the West have been limited to second-rate copycat 
publications, while the Global Policy Forum exhausted its potential in parallel with 
Medvedev’s decline.  
Of course, not all the Russian government’s claims to enjoy new global 
leadership are completely useless. Some of its status-seeking efforts can have certain 
positive effects. For example, a program aimed at propelling five top Russian 
universities into the ranks of the most prestigious globally will contribute to the rise of 
investment in academic infrastructure, as well as the international advancement of some 
scholars and scientists. But the scope of these globally-oriented innovations and their 
impact on the rest of the Russian system of higher education, which has suffered greatly, 
remain unclear. 
Some moves might bring material and non-material benefits to major proponents 
of various exit choices for Russia, although it is doubtful they can endure. “You cannot 
fool all the people all the time,” to quote Abraham Lincoln. Likewise, one cannot fool 
oneself all the time. To put it bluntly, programs to rapidly thrust Russia from C-grade to 
A-grade in the metrics of the global community tend to be groundless and poorly 
designed, and are likely destined to become unfulfilled promises. 
 
Argentina of the North? 
Russia is not the only country that seeks to reorient itself after experiencing the loss of 
global (or regional) leadership. France, for example, promoted its internationally 
recognized culture (from fine arts and cinema to haute cuisine) as a relatively successful 
substitution for the decline of its former grandeur. As to the international experience of 
other mid-range/second-order countries, the closest example for present-day Russia 
might be Argentina, one of the fastest-growing nations of the early twentieth century. It 
then muddled through numerous troubles and unsuccessful dictatorships (and 
democracies). It finally lost even its regional leadership to the more dynamic Brazil. 
Argentina’s adjustment took decades and was quite dramatic. 
Further aggravation of the mediocrity syndrome in Russia will contribute to 
preserving the above-mentioned pathologies almost by default, making it more difficult 
to overcome its intellectual trap. If the status quo persists over time, as Russia’s 
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classmates move forward, one should not be surprised if in the next two decades the 
country’s standing will be perceived around the globe as somewhere between Eastern 
Europe and Western China. Moreover, few will care about it beyond the region; the 
problems of Argentina are visible in Latin America, but they are not important to the 
rest of the world. 
But is there any other solution to the mediocrity syndrome for a C level country? 
After all, most C students are not mediocre in every subject. They often love certain 
classes and are able to achieve major successes in specific fields. A teenager who loves 
dolphins but is insensitive to the writings of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky can become an 
excellent marine biologist. A young musician who cannot comprehend multiplication 
tables may one day play in a world-class orchestra. (Despite Argentina’s failures, it gave 
birth to brilliant worldwide phenomena such as tango, Jorge Luis Borges, Julio Cortazar, 
and Diego Maradona.)  
Whether in school or among the countries of the world, accepting one’s C status 
is a path to honest self-assessment, which can lead to a careful selection of appropriate 
subjects to pursue and a systematic effort to achieve excellence in those niches. Despite 
the fact that many Russians would agree with their country’s C status, in most instances 
this understanding is limited to words rather than deeds: no major actions follow this 
recognition, neither at the level of government policy nor in individual life strategies. 
Russia’s sub-average report card does not mean that it is worthless and lacks future 
prospects. It is just that Russia needs to find relevant areas in which to apply its as of yet 
unfulfilled potential.   
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